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Abstract
We validate survey measures of social capital with a new behavioral data set that
examines whether citizens report a lost wallet to its owner. Using data from more than
17,000 lost wallets across 40 countries, we find that survey measures of social capital —
especially questions concerning generalized trust or generalized morality — are strongly
and significantly correlated with country-level differences in wallet reporting rates. A
second finding is that lost wallet reporting rates predict unique variation in the outputs
of social capital, such as economic development and government effectiveness, not
captured by existing measures.
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Social capital is generally thought of as a collection of values and beliefs that limit
opportunistic behavior and facilitate cooperation (Guiso, Sapienza, and Zingales 2011). As
such, social capital encapsulates several distinct constructs, and chief among them are honesty
and trust among strangers (Fukuyama 1995; Glaeser et al. 2000). Social capital is also
considered a fundamental factor underlying persistent differences in economic development
(Arrow 1972; Mokyr 2009), and has been linked to a country’s gross domestic product
(GDP), financial development, innovation, crime, and performance of its governance and
institutions (Algan and Cahuc 2010; Djankov et al. 2003; Fountain 1998; Knack and Keefer
1997; Lederman, Loayza, and Menendez 2002; Guiso, Sapienza, and Zingales 2004, 2011;
La Porta et al. 1997; Putnam, Leonardi, and Nanetti 1993; Tabellini 2008).
One of the more difficult issues in studying social capital is how to properly measure the
construct. Standard practice across the social sciences has been to use data from large-scale
surveys administered across countries,1 such as the World Values Survey (WVS). While
cross-country surveys have a number of attractive features, this approach also comes with a
number of limitations. For example, cross-country comparisons of survey data are potentially
biased due to cultural differences in how questions are interpreted (e.g., Laajaj et al. 2019),
how participants make use of response scales (Johnson et al. 2005), and the the degree that
responses are influenced by social desirability concerns (Bernardi 2006). That such response
biases may vary across countries presents a challenge for drawing clean comparisons through
the use of survey data.2 Layered on top of these concerns is whether survey responses translate
to concrete, meaningful behaviors despite various cognitive biases and social desirability
effects (Bertrand and Mullainathan 2001; Krosnick 1999). These limititations raise the
possibility that subjective surveys of social capital have little correspondence with objective
measures of social capital.3 As a point of comparison, survey data on corruption perceptions
1. Past research has explored experimental measures of trust in economic games (Glaeser et al. 2000;
Karlan 2005), but lab experimental measures are not widely available at the scale needed for cross-country
comparisons (see Fehr et al. 2003 and Bellemare and Kröger 2007 for representative experiments in Germany
and the Netherlands). It also remains an open question as to what extent behavior in the lab generalizes to
the field (Levitt and List 2007). Researchers have also used behavioral proxies of social capital such as voter
turnout and blood donations per capita (Guiso, Sapienza, and Zingales 2004; Nannicini et al. 2013). Because
such behaviors are subject to different rules and regulations across countries, they have primarily been used
to examine variation in social capital within rather than across countries.
2. Many survey measures are also conducted using face-to-face interviews, which likely excerbate the
variation in response biases across countries (e.g., for the WVS, see https://www.worldvaluessurvey.org
/AJDocumentation.jsp?CndWAVE=7&COUNTRY=).
3. Our data can directly speak to the issue of social desirability bias in survey responses. In addition to
our lost wallet data, we conducted nationally representative surveys in the United Kingdom, Poland, and
the United States. Respondents were given a detailed description of the wallet-drop off procedure (along
with pictures of the wallet contents) and asked to report the likelihood that, if facing such a situation, they
would contact the owner to return the lost item. The median response in all three countries was 100%. These
estimates are considerably higher than actual wallet return rates.
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has been found to correspond poorly with observable levels of corruption, both when looking
at the correspondence within communities (Olken 2009) and across countries (Razafindrakoto
and Roubaud 2010).
This paper provides a cross-country behavioral benchmark for studying social capital.
We recently conducted a large international field experiment in which we turned in lost
wallets with varying amounts of money at public and private institutions and measured
whether recipients emailed the owners to return the wallets (Cohn et al. 2019). In total, we
deposited over 17,000 wallets in 355 cities spanning 40 countries. Returning a lost wallet
contains elements of honesty towards strangers, and has been viewed as a representative
instance of social capital (Gintis 2016).4,5 Like multi-country surveys, our data is designed to
be portable across countries. Unlike survey studies, our data set examines a commonplace
yet consequential behavior, and one in which respondents were unaware their behavior was
observed by others. In the Online Appendix, we report a number of robustness checks that
support the validity of our lost wallet paradigm, including that wallet reporting rates are
unlikely to be confounded by risk of detection, legal regulations, beliefs about finder’s fees,
or cross-country differences in email usage. Furthermore, Figure 1 illustrates that wallet
reporting rates in our experiment are negatively correlated with objective behavioral proxies
of dishonest behavior (such as cheating on taxes and corruption of public officials) that
are available at the regional level for the US and Italy (see the the Online Appendix for
details). Together, the results suggest that our measure captures important variation in
honest behavior across countries.
Our behavioral measure of social capital can serve as a benchmark for a number of widely-
used survey measures of social capital. Within economics, researchers have focused on survey
questions that measure preferences or beliefs related to cooperation and prosocial behavior.
The most popular measure of this sort centers on generalized trust, in which social capital
4. In reviewing the literature on different measures of social capital, Paldam (2000) states “the famous
wallet-test is an attempt to measure trust in a more general way: Here N wallets are ‘forgotten’ in public
places and the test is how many that are handed back” (p. 644). Survey data also suggests that returning a
lost wallet is viewed as an act of social capital. For example, when surveying nationally representative samples
in the United Kingdom, Poland, and the United States, we found that the large majority of respondents
(89%) viewed keeping a lost wallet as “somewhat inappropriate” or “very inappropriate” (Cohn et al. 2019).
5. Knack and Keefer (1997) compared trust scores to data from a lost-wallet study conducted by Reader’s
Digest. However, the sample size of the Digest study was considerably smaller than our current data set,
at only 400 wallets total. Furthermore, this data is compromised by potential confounds which our study
took explicit steps to remove. As an example, Reader’s Digest dropped wallets in public spaces, which allows
for selection effects (i.e., individuals who select into the study by deciding to pick up a lost wallet may be
different from those who do not). By contrast, in our study we returned lost wallets to employees at the front
desk of different institutions, thereby providing greater experimental control over who participated in the
experiment. In the Online Appendix we provide a number of other robustness checks that rule out other
potential measurement confounds. For these reasons, our data likely represent a substantial improvement in
comprehensiveness and fidelity compared to previous lost wallet studies.
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Dishonesty Index
 Italy
Notes: The y-axis represents the percentage of recipients in each city reporting a lost wallet in the US
(left panel) and Italy (right panel). The x-axis represents city-level dishonesty index scores, with higher
numbers reflecting greater dishonesty. For the US, our dishonesty index was constructed by extracting the
first principal component from (1) the share of self-employed individuals in a city who reports an income in
2009 within US $500 of the first Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC) kink, as a percentage of individuals with
non-zero self-employment income, as a measure of cheating on taxes (Chetty, Friedman, and Saez 2013), and
(2) the number of federal court convictions for corrupt practices between 1976 and 2002 per 10,000 public
officials in the state that the city belongs to (Glaeser and Saks 2006). For Italy, our dishonesty index was
constructed by extracting the first principal component from (1) municipality-level rates of compliance or
payment of a television licensing fee (Buonanno et al. 2019), (2) the difference between the cumulative amounts
of public money allocated to capital expenditures and existing amounts of physical infrastructure (Golden
and Picci 2006), and (3) historical data on prosecutors’ requests to proceed with a criminal investigation
against a member of Parliament (Nannicini et al. 2013). Lines represent the best fit to the data based on
OLS estimation.
is measured as the aggregate response to the question, “generally speaking, would you say
that most people can be trusted or that you need to be very careful in dealing with people?”
Another common measure involves survey responses concerning norms of civic cooperation
(Guiso, Sapienza, and Zingales 2011; Herrmann, Thöni, and Gächter 2008). This index is
based on the degree of disapproval of actions that impose social costs onto others — such as
cheating on taxes, avoiding fares on public transit, and accepting bribes. Yet another measure
examines generalized morality or universal moral values (Tabellini 2008; Enke 2019), which
emphasize norms of appropriate conduct and behavior with others beyond one’s immediate
family, kinship, or social group. More recent data sets such as the Global Preferences Survey
(Falk et al. 2018) also measure various forms of prosocial preferences related to social capital.
Within sociology and political science, social capital researchers have focused on survey
questions related to social connectedness — the advantages and opportunities accruing to
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people through their social networks or membership in certain communities (Bourdieu 1986;
Putnam, Leonardi, and Nanetti 1993). Here, social capital is measured as the average number
of voluntary social groups a survey respondent belongs to (e.g., Knack and Keefer 1997).
Unlike the measures of social capital that focus on commonly-held values or beliefs, social
connectedness emphasizes the number and strength of social ties to a community.
We compare the performance of these various survey measures of social capital to our
behavioral measure of social capital (i.e., reporting a lost wallet), and document two main
findings. The first is that only some survey measures of social capital meaningfully correlate
with our behavioral measure of social capital. The best predictors of wallet reporting rates
are generalized trust, generalized morality, and norms of civic cooperation. Other survey
measures, including social connectedness and social preference measures from the Global
Preferences Survey, do not reliably predict wallet reporting rates. The fact that only some
survey measures are predictive of honest behavior (e.g., generalized trust from the WVS)
while other seemingly-similar measures of social capital are not (e.g., generalized trust from
the GPS) highlights the importance of using behavioral measures to validate survey responses.
The second finding is that wallet reporting rates in our data also serve as a strong predictor of
the economic outputs associated with social capital. In fact, wallet reporting rates outperform
virtually every survey measure in predicting country-level differences in GDP, total factor
productivity and indicators of government effectiveness. We conclude with implications of
our lost wallet data for research on social capital.
A Global Field Experiment
We use behavioral data from a field experiment we recently conducted that consists of 17,303
lost wallets from 355 cities across 40 countries (Cohn et al. 2019). Figure 2 provides an
overview of the countries covered in our data set. We typically turned in 400 wallets in the
six to eight largest cities of each country. Wallets were turned in at one of five different
institutions: (i) banks; (ii) theaters, museums, or other cultural establishments; (iii) post
offices; (iv) hotels; and (v) public offices, such as police stations, courts of law, or town
halls. We focused on these institutions because they serve as essential pillars of civic life, and
typically have a public reception area that allowed us to perform the drop-offs.
Experimenters in our study handed over a lost wallet (that they ostensibly found outside on
the street) to a front-desk worker and asked them to take care of the wallet. The experimenter
would then promptly leave without requesting written proof of the transaction. By telling
recipients that the wallet was found outside the building, we prevented possible concerns
that the owner might come back and look for the wallet at that exact institution (or at least
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Figure 2: Coverage of Lost Wallet Data (Blue Countries)
provided wallet recipients with plausible deniability of having received the wallet). After
performing the wallet drop-off and exiting the building, experimenters would immediately
record several recipient characteristics and situational factors. For recipient characteristics,
experimenters made note of the recipient’s gender and approximate age (i.e., whether the
person was 40 years or older). For situational factors, experimenters made note of whether
other coworkers or bystanders were present during the transaction, which we use as a proxy
for how busy or observable the recipient was.6 Experimenters also noted whether a computer
was visible at the recipient’s desk, which we use as a proxy for lower effort costs of contacting
the owner.
For our wallets we used transparent business card cases, allowing the recipient to inspect
its content without having to open the wallet. Each wallet contained three identical business
cards in order to contact the owner, and we typically created three fictitious male owners for
each country using common local names. The wallets also contained a grocery list, a small
dimple key, and (depending on experimental treatment) some money. To signal that the owner
of the wallet was likely a resident, the business cards and shopping list were always provided
in the country’s local language and any money inside the wallet was always in local currencies.
Business cards in each wallet were associated with a unique email address, allowing us to
identify individual wallets that were reported. Our dependent measure was whether a wallet
was reported to its owner by email within 100 days. For detailed information on the study
procedure we direct the reader to the Supplemental Materials of Cohn et al. (2019). Data for
6. In the Online Appendix we report additional analyses which suggest that concerns of being observed do
not influence country differences in wallet reporting rates.
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the study is publicly available at https://doi.org/10.7910/DVN/YKBODN.
In the experiment we randomly varied the amount of money inside the wallet, with wallets
usually containing either no money or the equivalent of US $13.45 (adjusted for purchasing
power parity). We also ran additional treatment arms in the United States, United Kingdom,
and Poland, including a high stakes version in which wallets contained the equivalent of US
$94.15 and another version that excluded the dimple key from the wallet. Country-level
reporting rates were strongly correlated across experimental treatments — for example, the
rank-order correlation between the $13.45 condition and the condition without money was
0.939 — so we combine data across conditions for the present analysis. The results we report
below are virtually unchanged when we restrict our analysis only to wallets containing no
money, or only to wallets containing money.
Unless stated otherwise, for all analyses we regress wallet reporting rates on country-level
variables of social capital using ordinary least squares (OLS) estimation. Observations are
coded as 100 when a wallet was reported and 0 otherwise, and country-level explanatory
variables (e.g., survey measures of generalized trust) are standardized to have a mean of
zero and standard deviation of one. With this coding scheme, regression coefficients can
be interpreted as the percentage point difference in reporting rates associated with a one
standard deviation change in the explanatory variable. For all country-level explanatory
variables, we use data from the same time period as when we conducted our field experiment;
if country-level data was not available during that time period, then we use the most recent
data available following the completion of our field experiment (see the Online Appendix for
details). All regressions also include fixed effects for treatment condition, type of institution
that wallet drop-off was performed at, as well as recipient and situational characteristics.
Standard errors were adjusted for clustering at the country-level, and we also correct p-
values to account for the false discovery rate that may arise from multiple hypothesis testing
(Benjamini and Hochberg 1995). In the Online Appendix, we show that our results are robust
when not including our set of control variables in the analyses, or when using probit rather
than OLS models.
Results
Validating Survey Measures of Social Capital
Figure 3 illustrates the country-level correlations between survey measures of social capital
and wallet reporting rates, and Table S3 in the Online Appendix lists pairwise correlations
between all measures.
7
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Social Connections
 H
Notes: Scatterplots display the country-level relationship between wallet reporting rates and (A) generalized
trust from the World Values Survey, (B) generalized morality (“respect and tolerance for others”) from the
World Values Survey, (C) universal moral value scores from the Moral Foundations Questionnaire (Enke 2019;
Graham et al. 2011), (D) an index of civic cooperation norms from the World Values Survey (Guiso, Sapienza,
and Zingales 2011), (E–G) trust, positive reciprocity, and altruism scores from the Global Preferences Survey
(Falk et al. 2018), (H) an index of social connectedness from the World Values Survey (Knack and Keefer
1997). For each graph the y-axis represents wallet reporting rates in a given country (from 0-100%) and
the x-axis represents the explanatory variable (standardized at the country-level to have a mean of 0 and
standard deviation of 1). Lines represent the best fit to the data based on OLS estimation.
Of the eight survey measures of social capital, generalized trust from the WVS is the
strongest predictor of wallet reporting rates (country-level r = 0.57). Table 2 provides
regression coefficients that adjust for our set of controls listed earlier. Column 1 (Panel A)
indicates that a one standard deviation change in generalized trust is associated with an
9.0 percentage point increase in reporting a lost wallet (p = 0.005). To give a sense of the
magnitude of this effect, a 9 percentage point increase represents roughly half a standard
deviation in the total variation of wallet reporting rates across countries.
The second notable predictor of wallet reporting rates was a survey measure of generalized
morality, or the tendency to adhere to norms of appropriate conduct and behavior towards
anonymous strangers.7 Following Tabellini (2008), we use the WVS measure which asks
7. Consistent with the results reported here, in Cohn et al. (2019) we report additional results showing
that country level characteristics associated with generalized morality — such as whether a national language
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respondents to indicate whether “tolerance and respect for other people” is one of the top
five qualities children are encouraged to learn at home.8 Shown in column 2 of Table 2 (Panel
A), this measure is associated with an 8.3 percentage point increase in reporting a lost wallet,
equivalent to a 0.42 standard deviation in the total variation of wallet reporting rates across
countries (p = 0.005).
Another measure of generalized morality proposed by Enke (2019) takes the difference
score between “universal” and “particularist” moral values from the Moral Foundations
Questionnaire (Graham et al. 2011). This survey measure is based on a theoretical framework
from moral psychology which distinguishes between impersonal (universal) values such as
fairness and individual rights, and group-specific (particularist) values such as in-group loyalty
and respect for established hierarchies. Higher scores on this measure reflect societies that
emphasize universal, impersonal values relative to group-specific ones. Column 3 of Table 2
(Panel A) indicates that this measure is associated with a 6.8 percentage point increase in
wallet reporting rates, equivalent to a 0.35 standard deviation in the total variation of wallet
reporting rates across countries (p = 0.015).
Next we examine norms of civic cooperation, which measure the degree of disapproval
for actions that confer a private benefit while imposing a social cost on others (Knack and
Keefer 1997). Following Guiso, Sapienza, and Zingales (2011), we extract the first principal
component from three WVS items which ask opinions about claiming public benefits one is
not entitled to, free riding on public goods, and accepting bribes. Using this index we find
that norms of civic cooperation also predict wallet return rates, albeit less strongly than
generalized trust. Shown in column 4 of Table 2 (Panel A), civic cooperation is associated
with a 5.5 percentage point increase in wallet reporting rates, equivalent to a 0.28 standard
deviation in the total variation of wallet reporting rates across countries (p = 0.015).
We also examine three measures of prosocial beliefs and preferences collected from the
Global Preferences Survey — generalized trust, altruism, and positive reciprocity (Falk
et al. 2018). Despite their apparent similarity to other measures of social capital, all three of
these items do a relatively poor job of predicting country-level wallet reporting rates. The
does not permit the dropping of first person pronouns (Kashima and Kashima 1998), a country’s share of
Protestants (Putnam, Leonardi, and Nanetti 1993; Weber 1930), weaker family ties (Alesina and Giuliano
2014), and communities with historically low pathogen prevalence (Fincher et al. 2008; Fincher and Thornhill
2012) — are also positively correlated with wallet return rates.
8. Tabellini’s index of generalized morality varies across papers. In Tabellini (2008) the index is a composite
of the generalized trust and respect items from the WVS, and in Tabellini (2010) the index also includes a
measure of obedience towards parents and locus of control. We decided to use the single respect item as
our measure of generalized morality because (a) this item appears to most closely resemble the construct of
interest (i.e., has the highest face validity), and (b) so that cleaner comparisons can be made in relation to
generalized trust. When we use the other indices used by Tabellini we find similar results to those reported
above.
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trust item from the GPS is negatively and not significantly correlated with wallet reporting
rates (p = 0.995), and both the positive reciprocity and altruism questions are also not
significantly correlated with wallet reporting rates (p-values are 0.995 and 0.372, respectively).
The null result for trust responses from the GPS is particularly surprising given the relatively
strong performance of the generalized trust measure from the WVS.9 These results, however,
are consistent with recent work suggesting that the GPS measures, which were validated
using a sample of German participants, do not necessarily generalize to other populations
(Bauer, Chytilová, and Miguel 2020). Table S3 in the Online Appendix also suggests that the
GPS measures tend to correlate weakly with other survey measures of social capital besides
generalized trust.
Our last survey measure concerns social connectedness, or the strength of voluntary
social ties among group members (Bourdieu 1986; Putnam, Leonardi, and Nanetti 1993).
Following Knack and Keefer (1997), we proxy social connectedness using the average number
of voluntary social groups (such as religious, professional, or political organizations) that
citizens in each country reported belonging to. Social connectedness is associated with a 2.3
percentage point increase in wallet reporting rates, an amount not significantly different from
a null of zero association (p = 0.206).
Lastly, we were able to examine the role of measurement error for our estimates of
generalized trust, as we had near-identical measures of both generalized trust and wallet
reporting rates (as suggested by Gillen, Snowberg, and Yariv 2019). Using an “obviously
related” instrumental variables (ORIV) regression10 for the subset of countries in which
we can apply the correction (n = 30), we find that the country-level correlation between
generalized trust and wallet reporting rates increases from 0.54 (without correction) to 0.62
(with correction). This modest increase suggests that our measures are unlikely subject to
serious measurement error concerns, at least at the country-level.
Using wallet reporting rates to predict economic and institutional performance
Ultimately of interest to economists is the usefulness of social capital measures in explaining
variation in economic development. We compare our lost wallet data to survey measures of
social capital in its ability to predict economic and institutional performance. Unlike our
previous analysis we now treat wallet reporting rates as a right hand side variable and, to
9. The trust item used in the GPS asked respondents to rate (from 0 “does not describe me at all” to 10
“describes me perfectly”) the statement, “As long as I am not convinced otherwise, I assume that people have
only the best intentions.” For the 60 countries that overlap, Falk et al. report a country-level correlation
between trust from the WVS and trust from the GPS of r = 0.49 (p < 0.01). For the 35 countries that
overlap in our data set, the country-level correlation is r = 0.64 (p < 0.01).
10. We provide full details on our ORIV specification in the online appendix.
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facilitate comparison, we aggregate all measures at the country-level and standardize these
measures (including wallet reporting rates) to have a mean of zero and standard deviation of
one. Our aim here is not to establish causality, but rather to examine the extent that our
behavioral measure contains new information, relative to existing survey measures of social
capital, in explaining economic development.
Table 2 illustrates the additional predictive value of wallet reporting rates, over and above
each survey measure of social capital, in explaining country-level variation in economic and
institutional performance. Column 1 reports the bivariate relationship between each survey
measure of social capital and GDP per capita,11 and column 2 reports the multivariate model
where wallet reporting rates are included alongside each measure of social capital. The same
exercise is repeated for total factor productivity in columns 3 and 4 of the table. Two patterns
clearly emerge from the table. First, wallet reporting rates explain substantial variation in
economic productivity above existing measures of social capital. For instance, when predicting
GDP per capita, adding wallet reporting rates alongside generalized trust increases the model
R-squared by over 70% (from 0.36 in the bivariate model to 0.62 in the multivariate model).
Second, for the multivariate models, wallet reporting rates outperform (in terms of coefficient
size) nearly every survey measure of social capital, and often substantially so.
The last four columns of Table 2 illustrate that wallet reporting rates also explain unique
variation in institutional performance across countries. Columns 5–8 of the table report the
same analysis used in the previous paragraph, but with World Bank government effectiveness
ratings and a behavioral measure of institutional efficiency (i.e., the proportion of incorrectly
addressed international mail that is returned; Chong et al. 2014) as outcome variables.12
Similar to our economic productivity measures, we find that wallet reporting rates explain
substantial variation in institutional performance not captured by existing survey measures
of social capital.
To quantify the relative contribution of wallet reporting rates in explaining economic
outputs, we performed a series of pairwise dominance analyses (Azen and Budescu 2003;
Budescu 1993). This procedure decomposes the total R-squared from a multivariate model
into the relative contribution provided by each variable in the model, with contribution weights
standardized to sum to one. We conducted a dominance analysis for all 32 comparisons
provided in Table 2 (eight multivariate models for each of our four outcome variables). Results
11. We conducted our lost wallet experiment from 2013 to 2016, so we use GDP and total factor productivity
indices from 2017. Data are from Penn World Tables.
12. The World Bank has five other indices of governance quality: (1) voice and accountability, (2) political
stability and absence of violence, (3) regulatory quality, (4) rule of law, and (5) control of corruption.
Compared to government effectiveness ratings, we find even more pronounced effects of wallet reporting rates
in predicting these other indices.
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are reported in Table S4 in the online appendix. For 31 of the 32 comparisons, we find that
wallet reporting rates contribute the majority of variance explained in the model. In 25 of the
comparisons wallet reporting rates outperform its survey counterpart by more than a factor
of two. Thus, a country’s propensity to report a lost wallet appears to contain considerable
new information above existing survey measures in explaining cross-country differences in
economic performance.
Conclusion
In this paper we use a behavioral measure from Cohn et al. (2019) to validate survey
measures of social capital, and establish two stylized facts. First, some survey measures of
social capital, such as generalized trust and generalized morality, are strongly correlated
with country differences in reporting a lost wallet. This finding validates the large and
widespread use of cross-country survey data as a proxy for social capital, and suggests that
skepticism over survey measures of social capital may be unwarranted (see also Bjørnskov
2020). It is also reassuring that the most widely used survey measure of social capital
— the generalized trust measure from the WVS — is most predictive of wallet reporting
rates. Other measures, such as prosocial preference measures from the recently developed
Global Preferences Survey, performed relatively poorly in predicting wallet reporting rates.
Additional tests and validation may be needed to establish whether such measures can serve
as useful proxies of a country’s social capital.
A second finding is that lost wallet reporting rates explain additional variation in economic
and institutional performance across countries, suggesting that our measure contains unique
information not captured by existing measures of social capital. When feasible, researchers
may wish to use lost wallet reporting rates from our data, alone or in combination with
existing survey measures, to help understand the causes and consequences of social capital.
12
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Table 1: Survey Measures and Wallet Reporting Rates
Panel A










Institution FE yes yes yes yes
Recipient FE yes yes yes yes
Situation FE yes yes yes yes
Treatment FE yes yes yes yes
Observations 16,895 16,621 15,494 16,321
Countries 39 38 35 37
Panel B
(5) (6) (7) (8)
Trust (GPS) −1.201
(2.766)







Institution FE yes yes yes yes
Recipient FE yes yes yes yes
Situation FE yes yes yes yes
Treatment FE yes yes yes yes
Observations 15,895 15,895 15,895 13,623
Countries 36 36 36 30
Notes: OLS estimates with standard errors clustered at the country-level. The dependent variable in all
models takes a value of 100 if a wallet was reported and 0 otherwise. All models include controls for the
type of institution the wallet drop-off was performed at, characteristics about the recipient of the lost wallet
(gender, age), situational characteristics of the wallet drop-off (the presence of a computer, coworkers, or
other bystanders), and treatment condition. For full details on control variables see Cohn et al. (2019).
Significance levels after correcting for the false discovery rate (Benjamini and Hochberg 1995): ∗ p ≤ 0.10, ∗∗
p ≤ 0.05, ∗∗∗ p ≤ 0.01.
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Table 2: Predictive Value of Wallet Reporting Rates
Log GDP Log Productivity Government Letter Grade
per capita (TFP) Effectiveness Efficiency
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Generalized 0.424∗∗∗ 0.177∗∗ 0.108∗ 0.001 0.554∗∗∗ 0.334∗∗∗ 0.074 −0.008
trust (0.093) (0.065) (0.049) (0.046) (0.078) (0.079) (0.041) (0.038)
Wallets 0.436∗∗∗ 0.196∗∗∗ 0.387∗∗∗ 0.144∗∗∗
(0.084) (0.052) (0.076) (0.047)
N 39 39 38 38 39 39 39 39
R2 0.358 0.615 0.122 0.403 0.506 0.673 0.073 0.263
Generalized 0.410∗∗∗ 0.220∗∗∗ 0.175∗∗∗ 0.119∗∗∗ 0.545∗∗∗ 0.348∗∗∗ 0.090∗∗ 0.021
morality (0.076) (0.045) (0.039) (0.036) (0.088) (0.072) (0.033) (0.037)
Wallets 0.367∗∗∗ 0.112∗∗∗ 0.380∗∗∗ 0.134∗∗
(0.075) (0.035) (0.082) (0.050)
N 38 38 37 37 38 38 38 38
R2 0.417 0.650 0.385 0.489 0.503 0.67 0.106 0.271
Universal Moral 0.263∗∗ 0.032 0.179∗∗∗ 0.105 0.165 −0.116 0.118∗∗ 0.069
Values (0.099) (0.078) (0.044) (0.059) (0.116) (0.076) (0.041) (0.041)
Wallets 0.522∗∗∗ 0.167∗∗∗ 0.635∗∗∗ 0.111∗∗∗
(0.095) (0.049) (0.086) (0.034)
N 35 35 35 35 35 35 35 35
R2 0.153 0.593 0.335 0.545 0.046 0.540 0.219 0.360
Civic 0.256∗∗ 0.096 0.138∗∗∗ 0.081 0.276∗∗ 0.087 0.086∗ 0.040
Cooperation (0.087) (0.087) (0.034) (0.043) (0.098) (0.067) (0.043) (0.054)
Wallets 0.451∗∗∗ 0.144∗∗∗ 0.536∗∗∗ 0.131∗∗
(0.086) (0.048) (0.075) (0.053)
N 37 37 36 36 37 37 37 37
R2 0.158 0.586 0.229 0.431 0.128 0.547 0.095 0.286
Trust (GPS) 0.319∗∗ 0.308∗∗∗ 0.061 0.050 0.333∗∗ 0.321∗∗∗ −0.016 −0.018
(0.140) (0.099) (0.072) (0.050) (0.113) (0.065) (0.050) (0.039)
Wallets 0.496∗∗∗ 0.197∗∗∗ 0.523∗∗∗ 0.133∗∗∗
(0.086) (0.048) (0.064) (0.043)
N 36 36 34 34 36 36 36 36
R2 0.196 0.616 0.035 0.383 0.197 0.628 0.003 0.213
Positive 0.118 0.095 −0.020 −0.027 0.096 0.072 0.009 0.003
Reciprocity (GPS) (0.11) (0.092) (0.053) (0.045) (0.100) (0.064) (0.040) (0.044)
Wallets 0.499∗∗∗ 0.201∗∗∗ 0.527∗∗∗ 0.133∗∗
(0.102) (0.047) (0.084) (0.044)
N 36 36 34 34 36 36 36 36
R2 0.027 0.450 0.005 0.367 0.017 0.454 0.001 0.209
Altruism (GPS) 0.051 0.160 −0.009 0.026 0.040 0.155 −0.033 −0.006
(0.116) (0.964) (0.052) (0.050) (0.119) (0.085) (0.037) (0.037)
Wallets 0.541∗∗∗ 0.205∗∗∗ 0.566∗∗∗ 0.132∗∗∗
(0.108) (0.049) (0.075) (0.043)
N 36 36 34 34 36 36 36 36
R2 0.005 0.480 0.001 0.366 0.003 0.485 0.015 0.209
Social 0.242∗∗∗ 0.101 0.094∗∗ 0.044 0.413∗∗∗ 0.261∗∗∗ 0.071∗∗ 0.042
Connections (0.066) (0.071) (0.038) (0.039) (0.076) (0.072) (0.031) (0.035)
Wallets 0.472∗∗∗ 0.168∗∗∗ 0.503∗∗∗ 0.096∗
(0.077) (0.045) (0.089) (0.045)
N 30 30 30 30 30 30 30 30
R2 0.155 0.620 0.105 0.367 0.277 0.601 0.091 0.222
Note: OLS estimates with robust standard errors in parentheses. Outcome variables are log GDP per capita, log total factor
productivity (relative to the United States), government effectiveness ratings from the World Bank, and the proportion of
incorrectly addressed international mail from a country that is returned to sender (Chong et al. 2014). All explanatory variables
are aggregated at the country-level and standardized to have a mean of zero and standard deviation of one. Significance levels
after correcting for the false discovery rate (Benjamini and Hochberg 1995): ∗ p ≤ 0.10, ∗∗ p ≤ 0.05, ∗∗∗ p ≤ 0.01.
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